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Abstract
We conduct a field experiment on conflict in swimming pools. When all lanes are occupied, an
actor joins the least crowded lane and asks one of the swimmers to move to another lane. The lane
represents a contested scarce resource. We vary the actor’s valuation (high and low) for the good
through the message they deliver. Also, we take advantage of the natural variation in the number
of swimmers to proxy for their valuation. Consistent with theoretical predictions, a swimmer’s
propensity to engage in conflict increases in scarcity (incentive effect) and decreases in the actor’s
valuation (discouragement effect). We complement the results with survey evidence.
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1. Introduction
Conflict is an unavoidable part of life. People engage in conflict when competing for scarce
resources, such as physical resources, employment opportunities and promotions, mates, scarce
vaccines, and so on. A vast literature in economics and other disciplines examines several aspects
of conflict using theoretical and empirical methods. This literature is characterized by a strong
heterogeneity in the methodological approaches used to study conflict, but an even more
fundamental diverging feature is the way in which conflict is defined in theory and operationalized
in empirical analysis. 1 In an effort to systematize existing work, Kimbrough et al. (2020: p. 999) –
following Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) – define conflict ‘as a situation in which agents choose
inputs that are costly, both to themselves and relative to some socially efficient optimum, in pursuit
of private payoffs framed as wins and losses’. This definition is helpful in demarcating conflict
from situations in which a principal (e.g., firm) seeks ways to maximize effort from agents (e.g.,
workers), because it precludes cases where expended efforts create positive third-party
externalities.
In this paper, we present novel evidence from the field on the behavior of economic agents
in a conflict environment, where competing parties can engage in conflict and the efforts they invest
create no positive externalities. More specifically, we test the role of scarcity and players’
valuations in determining effort invested into the conflict. Following a simple framework that
resembles those commonly used for the study of contests, we predict that effort increases in scarcity
(through an increase in a player’s valuation of the contested resource) and decreases in the other
player’s valuation. A key contribution of this work is that it represents a methodological
advancement in the literature on conflict by introducing a method for initiating conflict and testing
theoretical predictions related to it in a field experiment. In doing so, we show how previous lab
evidence generalizes to a field setting.
The experiment was conducted in a number of swimming pools in Brisbane, Australia. We
staged a conflict scenario by employing four actors who, acting individually, asked swimmers in
the pool to move to a different lane, so that the actors could have more space to train. 2 Hence, our
actors initiated a conflict over a scarce resource, namely space in the water. In this tightly controlled
environment in the field, we vary a signal on the actors’ valuation for the scarce resource, by
manipulating the type of justification that they deliver along with their request. In addition, we
exploit the naturally occurring variation in scarcity (measured by the number of people swimming
in each lane). We document the responses of swimmers to the request by our actors and whether
they agreed to leave the lane or not. We also code these responses into varying degrees of

On this issue, see Kimbrough and Sheremeta (2019): ‘Not only do the various disciplines [economics, psychology,
evolutionary biology, anthropology, political science, management] use different methods, models and kinds of data
studying conflict and war, there is also surprisingly little agreement on fundamentals such as how to define conflict.’
2
To avoid any confusion, we will always refer to our confederates as the actors and to the persons they engaged with
as the swimmers.
1
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willingness to engage in conflict. We find that, in line with theoretical predictions, a swimmer’s
propensity to engage in conflict increases in scarcity (incentive effect) and diminishes in the actor’s
stated valuation (discouragement effect). Moreover, the propensity to engage in conflict increases
in the swimmer’s speed, lending more support to the finding that individuals with a higher valuation
are more likely to invest resources into conflict. We complement these results with survey
evidence, which helps us better understand the way that the conflict scenario is perceived by
swimmers and to interpret the variables and effects of interest.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study using experimental data from the field
in order to test theoretical predictions related to conflict. One likely reason for the lack of existing
studies is the difficulty in implementing such a scenario in the field. We present here a methodology
that engages the experimental participants in conflict and allows us to test the effects of interest
through a controlled treatment variation, without creating any risks for participants. 3 By doing so,
we are able to take advantage of the benefits of field experiments in terms of ecological validity
and realism (Harrison and List, 2004).
One of the most common ways to model conflict in economics is to cast the problem in
terms of a contest (see Kimbrough et al., 2020) between players who compete for a scarce resource
(i.e., a prize) with ‘imperfectly specified and imperfectly enforced property rights’ (Garfinkel and
Skaperdas, 2007: p. 652). 4 The two most popular contest models are rent-seeking models (Tullock,
1980) and all-pay auctions (first adopted by Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983, and described in detail by
Hillman and Riley, 1989). Over time, the development of these models has provided valuable
theoretical predictions for the study of strategic behavior in conflicts (see Konrad, 2009, for a
review). Among these, two well-established theoretical results are worthy of attention (see
Kimbrough et al., 2020, for a detailed description). First, the aggregate level of conflict increases
in the size of the prize; this is known as the incentive effect. Second, in contests with asymmetric
players, the equilibrium effort exerted by the contestant with the lowest valuation diminishes as the
asymmetry increases (Baye et. Al., 1993, 1996; Baik, 1994). 5 This is called discouragement effect:
weaker players strategically cut their losses when facing stronger players.
Lab experiments have offered support both for a positive effect of own valuation on effort
(Bull et al.,1987; Van Dijk et al., 2001) as well as for the discouragement effect (Davies and Reilly,
1998; Fonseca, 2009). Beyond the lab, however, results are not as clear-cut. A different strand of
the literature using empirical data from sports tournaments, generally find mixed results. While
some studies find evidence in line with the incentive effect (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990),
This methodology has received ethical approval from two independent institutional review boards (see the
acknowledgements footnote for further details).
4
Notice, however, that contest and conflict are not synonyms. Contests can also be employed to model situations where
third party externalities are present, such as sports competitions or workplace tournaments, while the lack of such
externalities is an essential attribute of conflict.
5
The problem can be either in terms of asymmetric valuations or asymmetric abilities, the two frameworks being
isomorphic.
3
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others do not (Orszag, 1994). Similarly, the discouragement effect is supported in some (Brown,
2011; Tanaka and Ishino, 2012), but refuted in others (Guryan et al., 2009; Babington et al., 2020).
Two kinds of reasons help explain why these findings are inconclusive. First, empirical studies, by
definition, lack the control of experiments. Second, unlike a conflict, effort in sports competitions
is typically characterized by externalities (first and foremost on spectators), further complicating
the matter. We contribute to the still open and important research questions on the relationship
between scarcity, valuation and conflict by offering evidence from a controlled, natural field
experiment. 6

2. Experimental design
The experiment described here was conducted in six swimming pools in Brisbane, Australia,
between January and February 2019. We consider this setting well suited for a study on conflict,
due to a number of reasons. First, it features a scarce resource – space in the water – with naturally
occurring scarcity. Second, it offers a tightly controlled environment in the field, in which certain
important aspects of the environment can be objectively measured, such as the extent of scarcity
and observable characteristics of the individuals under consideration (swimmers in the pool). This
environment is also highly standardized, with all pools being of the same size (Olympic size,
including eight 50-meter-long lanes). Third, it offers the possibility of engaging with the swimmers
one-on-one, without the involvement of bystanders or other parties. Fourth, the study is conducted
in Australia, a country with a long successful tradition in the swimming sport, and one in which
swimming is performed by highly competitive individuals who take it very seriously. Hence, we
have an environment where the scarce resource is of substantial value for the typical individual in
the sample.
The interaction in our experiment includes the following elements: An actor employed by
the researchers walks to the shallow end of a swimming lane, enters the lane, and waits until a
swimmer stops, making sure that the swimmer is alone and no one else can overhear the
conversation. 7 Then, the actor speaks to the swimmer and asks him or her to leave the lane so the
actor has more space to train. This is the key feature of our design, in which our actors essentially
initiate a conflict with the swimmers over a scarce resource (space in the water).
Our exogenous treatment variation consists of two different messages delivered by the
actors, corresponding to two different levels of their valuation of the scarce resource. In treatment
Low Valuation, the message is the following: ‘Excuse me, I need to train for a race. Do you mind
moving to a different lane?’. In treatment High Valuation the message was modified to reflect an
There are studies using field experiments to assess the role of tournaments as incentive mechanisms. Such studies
examine performance at the workplace (Erev et al., 1993; Bandiera et al., 2013), educational attainments (e.g. Leuven
et al., 2011; Herranz-Zarzoso and Sabater-Grande, 2018), salespersons motivation (e.g. Casas-Arce and MartinezJerez, 2009; Delfgaauw et al., 2013), or status (e.g. Kosfeld and Neckermann 2011). However, these experiments are
conducted in principal-agent settings and are not directly related to conflict.
7
In order to be inconspicuous and not attract any attention, we averaged between one and two observations per hour.
6
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even higher valuation by the actor: ‘Excuse me, there’s a race tomorrow I really need to train for.
Do you mind moving to a different lane?’. In order to standardize the interactions and keep
interaction protocol as tightly controlled as possible, we instructed actors to avoid engaging in
additional free-form conversation with the swimmers and respond to most possible queries from
the swimmers by saying ‘Well, I need to train, will you leave the lane or not?’, thus provoking a
binary decision by the swimmer on whether to follow the request, or stay in the lane. 8 They were
also instructed to avoid any form of escalation, and to immediately end the interaction and avoid
all provocation in case a swimmer showed any sign of aggression. 9 Actors recorded the exact verbal
response of the swimmer and whether they agreed to leave the lane. They also recorded certain
observable characteristics of the swimmer (gender, approximate age, approximate height,
perceived muscularity on a scale from 1 to 10, with higher values indicating a more muscular
swimmer).
The second key dimension in which variation occurred in the experiment was the scarcity
of the resource. This naturally occurring variation is measured by the number of swimmers per
lane, with more swimmers corresponding to more scarcity. Data were collected only under
conditions of scarcity, which in this setting means two things. First, in all collected observations,
all lanes in the pool were busy with at least one swimmer. Second, the lane in which the interaction
took place was always the least busy one in the pool, in the sense that all other lanes had at least as
many swimmers as the selected lane. 10 This is necessary in order to ensure that leaving the lane at
the actor’s request imposes a cost on the swimmer in terms of the scarce resource.
We employed four actors (two male and two female), trained them before the experiment,
and simulated the interactions until we were sure that they were sufficiently prepared. Data were
then collected in teams of three, including two actors and one research assistant (henceforth, RA).
The RA’s job was to select an appropriate lane for the next observation and record the number of
swimmers in each lane in the pool, as well as the speed of each swimmer in the selected lane. Then,
the RA told the actor which lane to enter and which message to deliver. Hence, randomization
across treatments was performed by the RA who was instructed to randomly switch between the
two messages. 11 The full instructions given by the experimenters to the RAs and the actors can be
found in Appendix A.
In case the swimmer asked what kind of race the actor is referring to, actors were instructed to respond that this was
a race at The University of Queensland. Indeed, each day, we conducted races among our actors, to avoid potential
criticism that our messages involved deception.
9
We note, however, that no escalation and no sign of aggression occurred in any of the 205 collected observations.
10
We did not collect any observations in lanes with more than three swimmers, because in such situations the value
of the prize (staying in the lane) is rather low in the first place.
11
Brisbane has more than 20 public, outdoor Olympic-size pools. Based on a two-week period of observation prior to
the experiment, we selected the six with the best conditions: they had to be sufficiently crowded to create conditions
of scarcity, and easy for the actors and RAs to mix in the crowd and disappear after each observation. The pools all
included a location (e.g., a cafe) where the RA could sit and take notes of the interaction without appearing suspicious.
In this respect, we note that in no single pool or occasion did our teams arouse any suspicion or attract the attention of
pool staff.
8
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3. Conceptual framework and hypotheses
Conflict and contest models in economics commonly assume that a number of players invest costly
and irreversible efforts while competing for a prize, and that their probability of winning the prize
is increasing in own and decreasing in the other player’s effort according to some contest success
function. Kimbrough et al. (2019) classify models used to study conflict in economics into contest
models, war of attrition games, Colonel Blotto games, guns versus butter games, and spatial
conflict models. Without loss of generality, we rely here on a simplified version of the well-known
rent-seeking contest by Tullock (1980) in order to describe the effects of interest. 12 We consider
two risk-neutral players (𝑖𝑖 = 1,2) who can exert effort levels 𝑒𝑒1 , 𝑒𝑒2 , in order to win a prize of value
𝑣𝑣1 , 𝑣𝑣2 , respectively. The contest success function of player 1 takes the form 𝑝𝑝1 = 𝑒𝑒

𝑒𝑒1

1 +𝑒𝑒2

, where 𝑝𝑝1

is the probability that player 1 wins the prize (with the contest success function being analogous
for player 2). This is known as a lottery contest success function. Costs of effort are linear: 𝑐𝑐1 (𝑒𝑒1 ) =
𝑒𝑒1 , 𝑐𝑐2 (𝑒𝑒2 ) = 𝑒𝑒2 . Given the above, the expected payoffs 𝜋𝜋1 and 𝜋𝜋2 for players 1 and 2 are equal to
the respective probability of winning the prize (𝑝𝑝) times the prize value (𝑣𝑣) minus the cost of effort
(𝑒𝑒):
𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋1 ) = 𝑒𝑒

𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋2 ) = 𝑒𝑒

𝑒𝑒1

1 +𝑒𝑒2

𝑒𝑒2

1 +𝑒𝑒2

𝑣𝑣1 − 𝑒𝑒1 ,

𝑣𝑣2 − 𝑒𝑒2 .

(1)
(2)

Solving the first-order conditions yields the following equilibrium efforts: 𝑒𝑒1∗ = (𝑣𝑣
𝑣𝑣1 𝑣𝑣2

(𝑣𝑣1 +𝑣𝑣2 )2

𝑣𝑣1 𝑣𝑣2

2
1 +𝑣𝑣2 )

𝑣𝑣1 ; 𝑒𝑒2∗ =

𝑣𝑣2 . The comparative statics reveal that own effort (𝑒𝑒1 ) is increasing in own valuation (𝑣𝑣1 )

and decreasing in the other player’s valuation (𝑣𝑣2 ) as long as 𝑣𝑣1 < 𝑣𝑣2 . For this reason, we have
chosen messages for the actors that convey a high valuation for the resource, especially in the high
valuation treatment. Moreover, survey evidence (reported in Section 4) suggests that this
assumption generally holds in our setting. The preceding analysis leads us to formulate our two
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: The probability that the swimmer leaves the lane is higher when the actor
delivers a higher valuation message. This hypothesis, known as the discouragement effect, directly
follows from the fact that a player’s effort is decreasing in the other player’s valuation, when the
other player values the resource more.

The particular choice of formalization that uses a rent-seeking contest is not crucial for obtaining the effects of
interest. It would suffice to formulate a generic contest success function that defines a player’s probability of winning
as a continuous and monotonic function, increasing in own and decreasing in the opponent’s effort (see Chowdury,
2021, for such a contest success function). Our objective is not to recreate a field setting that perfectly corresponds to
a stylized theoretical representation of conflict; after all, theoretical models aspire to capture certain elements of the
real world, while abstracting from others. The aim of the conceptual framework is to better illustrate how players’
valuations can be expected to affect their behavior.
12
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Hypothesis 2: The probability that the swimmer leaves the lane is lower when the resource
is scarcer (i.e., the lanes are busier). This hypothesis captures the positive relationship between a
player’s own valuation and his or her effort. Seen from the perspective of the swimmer, more acute
scarcity translates into a higher prize of winning the conflict and hence a higher willingness to
invest effort. An alternative formulation is in terms of the well-known incentive effect, which states
that the aggregate level of conflict increases in the size of the prize. Since the actor’s effort is by
design fixed in our setting, any change in the effort invested by the swimmer directly translates
into an equivalent change in the aggregate level of conflict.
An important part of our identification strategy is the interpretation of observed outcomes
in terms of the two hypotheses. In particular, an empirical question is how to measure the effort
invested by swimmers. In the experiment we observe two aspects of a swimmer’s behavior: first,
his or her verbal response to the request formulated by the actors; second, his or her actual decision
on whether to leave the lane as requested.
The decision to leave the lane is a crude measure of effort, in the sense that it takes a binary
form, but it has the advantage of being more directly and objectively quantifiable. A swimmer who
agrees to leave the lane essentially avoids conflict, conceding the prize (more space in the water)
by moving to a more crowded lane. By contrast, a swimmer who refuses to leave the lane engages
in direct confrontation and does not concede the scarce resource. Hence, comparing the two actions
(staying in the lane or leaving), staying is associated with higher effort for the swimmer. This rests
on our assumption that engaging in confrontation by responding negatively to the actor is indeed a
costly act, in other words that individuals are generally averse to being involved in a disagreement.
We hold this to be a plausible assumption. In this respect, notice also that the swimmer does not
know whether his or her refusal to leave the lane could escalate into a prolonged verbal
disagreement, or even physical confrontation. The survey evidence discussed in Section 4 shows
that a considerable share of swimmers would consider an escalation likely in this scenario.
The swimmer’s verbal response can deliver a more nuanced picture of the swimmer’s effort,
especially in case of a refusal to move to a different lane. Conditional on the swimmer staying in
the lane and thus engaging in confrontation, a verbal response can signal varying degrees of
determination and willingness to fight for the scarce resource. For instance, it can signal a
willingness to compromise by suggesting to share the lane, or promising to leave soon (see
Appendix B for the full list of responses). On the other hand, some swimmers deliver an absolute,
firm refusal, or even express their annoyance at the request. In order to perform the data analysis
with the verbal measure, we asked two independent coders to rate the responses of all swimmers
into one of four categories: 0 (swimmer left the lane); 1 (mild refusal, meaning that the swimmer
refused to leave but signaled a willingness to compromise or made some kind of concession); 2
(firm refusal); 3 (firm refusal accompanied by an expression of annoyance or anger). The coders
were given the exact text of the swimmer’s response, along with a description of each interaction
(including the information on whether the swimmer left the lane, as well as additional remarks by
7

the actor on non-verbal reactions by the swimmer). We then constructed the average of the two
coded responses, resulting in a variable that ranges from 0 to 3 in steps of 0.5, with higher values
indicating a higher invested effort. 13
Regarding scarcity, the main measure used in the analysis is the average number of
swimmers in the two lanes adjacent to the one where the interaction takes place (or in the one
adjacent lane in cases when the interaction takes place at one end of the pool). We rely on this
primary measure because the adjacent lanes are more readily visible to the swimmer at the time of
interaction. However, we confirm the robustness of our findings by measuring scarcity in terms of
the average number of swimmers per lane in the entire pool.

3. Results
Our sample consists of 205 swimmers (64% male). 104 observations were collected by male and
101 by female actors. Randomization across treatments resulted in 107 observations for the Low
Valuation and 98 observations for the High Valuation treatment. On average, there were 2.0
swimmers per lane in the pool and also per adjacent lane, while the selected lane where the
interactions took place had 1.4 swimmers (such that moving to a different lane always came at a
cost, as already explained in the previous section). 86 out of 205 swimmers (42%) followed the
actor’s request and left their lane, thus avoiding conflict. Conversely, 58% of swimmers declined
the request, thus engaging in the conflict situation that our actors initiated. Comparing by treatment,
a clear pattern emerges, with swimmers significantly more likely to avoid conflict and leave the
lane when the actor signaled a high valuation (49.0% in High Valuation vs. 35.5% in Low
Valuation, p=0.05, χ2 test). Using the non-binary measure of swimmers’ effort based on the
distribution of coded responses (see Figure 1) confirms that effort is lower in the high valuation
treatment (0.82 in High Valuation vs. 1.08 in Low Valuation, p=0.04, Mann-Whitney U test). These
results provide strong support for Hypothesis 1.

13

The tau-equivalent reliability of the two ratings is very high, with Cronbach’s alpha equal to 0.95.
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Figure 1. Swimmer’s coded effort, by actor’s valuation
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Turning to Hypothesis 2, we find that swimmers are significantly more willing to engage
in conflict as scarcity increases. Comparing those swimmers who agreed to leave and those who
did not (see Panel a in Figure 2), the resource is scarcer in the latter group (average number of
swimmers in the adjacent lanes: 2.20 vs. 1.75, p=0.01, Mann-Whitney test). If we use the average
number of swimmers in the entire pool as our measure of scarcity, the result is very similar (2.18
vs. 1.79, p=0.02, Mann-Whitney U test). Based on the non-binary measure, we find a positive
relationship between coded effort and the average number of swimmers in the pool (Spearman’s
ρ=0.14, p=0.05). Hence, our data support Hypothesis 2 as well.
Figure 2. The incentive effect: Scarcity and swimmer’s speed
Panel a: Swimmers in the adjacent langes
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Panel b: Speed (meters/second) of the swimmer
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We proceed to offer some additional support for the incentive effect. Our RAs measured
the speed of all swimmers in the sample before the interaction with the actors, allowing us to relate
their responses to how fast they are. Panel b in Figure 2 shows that those swimmers who refuse to
9

leave the lane are, on average, significantly faster than those who agree to leave (0.82 m/s vs. 0.77
m/s, p<0.01, Mann-Whitney U test). One can interpret this finding in terms of the incentive effect
that we are interested in, because faster swimmers are likely to have a higher valuation for the
scarce resource. This interpretation rests on the assumption that speed is positively associated with
valuation. An alternative interpretation of the effect of speed could be that it is related to a sense
of entitlement, if faster swimmers believe that they have more right to space in the water compared
to slow swimmers, who are less likely to be obstructed during their laps by someone in front of
them. Evidence from the post-experimental surveys (see Section 4 for details) clearly supports the
valuation interpretation and rejects the one based on entitlement. In the question ‘In general, would
you say that a fast swimmer values swimming in a less crowded lane more or less compared to a
slow swimmer?’, a large majority of 69% answered that a fast swimmer values the less crowded
lane more than the slow swimmer (with 27% of responses supporting an equal valuation and only
4% a higher valuation by the slower swimmer). On the contrary, when we asked ‘In general, would
you say that a fast swimmer has more or less right to have free space compared to a slow
swimmer?’, an overwhelming 93% of respondents said that both types of swimmers have the same
right to free space.
Table 1 displays the results of a multivariate regression analysis with the swimmer’s
response as dependent variable. In the first three columns, this is a binary variable on whether the
swimmer stayed in the lane and thus engaged in the conflict initiated by the actor, while in the last
three columns it is the intensity of the swimmer’s response, as coded by the two raters and with
higher values corresponding to a stronger perceived propensity to engage in conflict. 14 The
explanatory variables in the parsimonious specifications (1) and (4) include a dummy variable for
the high valuation treatment, the average number of swimmers per adjacent lane as a measure of
scarcity, and the swimmer’s speed as measured by our RA. Additional control variables in the
remaining specifications include the swimmer’s perceived muscularity as rated by the actor, the
swimmer’s height, and the actor’s and swimmer’s gender (as female dummy variables). 15 The
rationale for including the swimmer’s height and muscularity is to control for his or her physical
strength, which could become relevant in case of a physical confrontation. Although no such
confrontation could ever take place given the way our actors were instructed, it is conceivable that

Given the distributions of the dependent variables, estimation is based on the Probit model in the first two columns
and on the Tobit model in the last two columns. The results in columns (3) and (4) are generally robust to estimation
with Ordinary Least Squares instead of Tobit, although we note that the variable High Valuation retains its sign and
magnitude but loses its significance in the random effects OLS regression, due to a large increase in its standard error.
15
As already discussed, we have opted for the average number of swimmers per adjacent lane as the primary measure
of scarcity. We replicate all regressions replacing this variable with the average number of swimmers per lane in the
entire pool, and also with the difference between the number of swimmers in the adjacent lanes and the swimmer’s
lane. All results remain qualitatively the same.
14
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stronger, taller swimmers feel more confident in a conflict situation. Finally, columns (3) and (6)
include actor random effects. 16
Table 1. Regression analysis on swimmers’ behavior
Binary variable (stay in lane)
Coded response (effort)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

High Valuation

-0.42**
(0.18)

-0.42**
(0.19)

-0.41**
(0.19)

-0.47**
(0.22)

-0.44**
(0.22)

-0.42*
(0.22)

Swimmers per adjacent
lane

0.33***
(0.10)

0.33***
(0.10)

0.35***
(0.11)

0.26**
(0.10)

0.24**
(0.10)

0.24**
(0.10)

Swimmer’s speed

1.60***
(0.62)

1.62**
(0.67)

1.64**
(0.69)

1.37*
(0.74)

1.57**
(0.79)

1.50*
(0.79)

Swimmer’s muscularity

-0.01
(0.06)

-0.03
(0.06)

-0.03
(0.06)

-0.03
(0.06)

Swimmer’s height

-0.24
(1.54)

0.12
(1.59)

-0.04
(1.79)

-0.26
(1.78)

Female actor

-0.10
(0.19)

-0.05
(0.48)

-0.04
(0.22)

-0.05
(0.30)

Female swimmer

0.02
(0.28)

0.06
(0.29)

0.23
(0.33)

0.24
(0.33)

Actor random effects

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Number of observations

205

205

205

196

196

196

Notes: In columns 1-3 the estimation method is the Probit model and the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if
the swimmer refused to leave the lane at the actor’s request, and 0 otherwise. In columns 4-6 the estimation method is
the Tobit model and the dependent variable is the swimmer’s response as coded by the two raters. This variable is leftcensored at 0 and right-censored at 3, with higher values indicating a higher effort invested into conflict. The number
of observations is slightly lower in columns 4-6 because the coders did not assign a value to the response of those
swimmers who stayed in the lane but did not verbally respond to the actor’s request. Swimmer’s speed is the number
of meters covered per second, such that higher values indicate faster speed; Swimmer’s muscularity is based on the
ratings of the actors and ranges from 1 to 10, with higher values indicating higher perceived muscularity. Swimmer’s
height is measured in meters. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
1% level, respectively.

In line with the non-parametric analysis, Table 1 regressions offer support for Hypotheses
1 and 2. With regard to Hypothesis 1, the High Valuation treatment leads to significantly less
frequent and less intense refusals to leave the lane in every specification. With respect to
Hypothesis 2, we find that swimmers are more likely to refuse to leave their lane when the pool is
A Hausman specification test does not reject the null hypothesis that the random effects estimator is consistent,
hence we present random and not fixed effects regressions.
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busier (with more swimmers per lane) and therefore the resource is more scarce. Moreover, faster
swimmers are on average less likely to heed the actor’s request. As we have already argued, we
view this as additional evidence in support of the incentive effect, which implies that effort
increases in own valuation.
The regression analysis also allows us to assess the potential role of a number of observable
characteristics – included as control variables – on the propensity of swimmers to invest effort into
the enacted conflict scenario. As it turns out, the only significant predictors of behavior are the
ones linked to our key hypotheses, with all additional variables being very small in magnitude and
insignificant. These variables include the swimmer’s height and perceived muscularity (as proxies
for his or her physical strength), as well as the gender of both the actor and the swimmer. The
addition of actor random effects in (3) and (6) has no notable impact on any of the coefficients of
interest either. 17

4. Interpreting the results: Post-experimental surveys
Four months after completion of our experiment, in June 2019, our research assistants conducted
an ex post survey in the same six swimming pools. The sample size for the surveys was N=201.
The purpose of these surveys is to help us interpret the results of the experiment and better
understand the motivation behind swimmers’ responses, as well as the way in which they perceive
the experimental setting. The full surveys, including the distribution of responses, are shown in
Appendix C.
One of the survey questions (question 3 in Appendix C) presented respondents with a
hypothetical scenario, which was identical to the interaction that we staged during the actual
experiment. Specifically, we asked respondents to tell us if they would be willing to move to a
different lane if they found themselves in the position of the swimmer. Here we had two different
versions of the survey, one corresponding to the actor’s message in the Low Valuation and one to
the message in the High Valuation treatment (each respondent was randomly assigned to one
message only). The stated rates of willingness to leave the lane at the actor’s request were 69% in
Low Valuation, and 80% in High Valuation. Hence, survey respondents generally overstate their
propensity to comply with the actor’s request 18, but – in line with Hypothesis 1 and the results of
the actual experiment – they report a higher hypothetical willingness to avoid conflict and switch
lane when receiving the high valuation message (p=0.08, Mann-Whitney U test).

The results are robust to the inclusion of time and day fixed effects. Moreover, we have the information on the speed
provision in some lanes (slow, medium, or fast). This information is not included in the regressions, since less than
half of the observations (84 out of 205) were collected in lanes with such a provision. We note, however, that neither
the binary nor the coded measure of swimmer effort varies by speed provision (p=0.15, p=0.69, respectively; χ2 tests).
18
It is well known among social scientists that non-incentivized survey responses are subject to social desirability bias,
i.e., respondents tend to conceal preferences that are considered socially undesirable (Maccoby and Maccoby, 1954;
Edwards, 1957).
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A discussion is due with respect to our findings in support of Hypothesis 1. Why is it the
case that swimmers are more likely to avoid conflict and concede the scarce resource to high
valuation – as compared to low valuation – actors? Based on the simple theoretical framework of
Section 3, the answer is that a player facing an opponent with a higher valuation anticipates a low
winning probability, and therefore will strategically reduce own effort in order to keep effort costs
low, i.e., the discouragement effect. However, an alternative interpretation of our findings is that
the high valuation message prompts more pro-social behavior by swimmers, who are more willing
to give up part of the scarce resource in order to help someone who values it more than they do.
This would imply that the effect we observe between the two treatments is not mainly due to the
perception of one’s counterpart as someone who is willing to invest resources into a conflict, but
due to social preferences. Indeed, it is straightforward to show that if swimmers exhibit altruism
they are more likely to react to a high valuation message by decreasing their equilibrium effort
compared to a low valuation message. Assume the following utility functions for players 1 and 2,
respectively: 𝑢𝑢1 = 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋1 ) + 𝛼𝛼1 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋2 ), 𝑢𝑢2 = 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋2 ) + 𝛼𝛼2 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋1 ), where 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋1 ) and 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋2 ) are
defined as in Equations (1) and (2), and 𝛼𝛼1 , 𝛼𝛼2 ∈ (0,1) reflect the players’ degree of altruism. With
no loss of generality, call the swimmer player 1 and the actor player 2. It is easy to show that, in
equilibrium, player 1 chooses effort 𝑒𝑒1∗ =
(1+𝛼𝛼1 )

𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒 ∗

(𝑣𝑣1 −𝛼𝛼1 𝑣𝑣2 )2 (𝑣𝑣2 −𝛼𝛼2 𝑣𝑣1 )
(𝑣𝑣1 +𝑣𝑣2 −𝛼𝛼1 𝑣𝑣2 −𝛼𝛼2 𝑣𝑣1

)2

. A quick inspection shows that 𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1 <
2

0 whenever 𝑣𝑣1 < (1+𝛼𝛼 ) 𝑣𝑣2 . Fixing, for simplicity, 𝛼𝛼2 = 0, we can see that if the swimmer is
2

altruistic, the negative relationship between the opponent’s valuation and own effort is more
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒 ∗

frequently observed than in the purely self-interested model. The reason is that 𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1 is now negative
2

under a large range of parameters even when the swimmer values the lane more than the actor.
𝜕𝜕2 𝑒𝑒1∗

Moreover, we can show that 𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣

2 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼1

< 0, which implies a stronger discouragement effect the more

altruistic the swimmer is.
Question 4 in the survey asked respondents to state their reasons for complying with the
actor’s request in the hypothetical scenario, with multiple answers being allowed. The responses
to this question, shown in Appendix C, are illuminating. The two most common reasons given for
leaving the lane refer to the fact that the other person needs the lane more (67%), and to a desire to
help people (55%). The fact that two-thirds of respondents say that the hypothetical actor needs the
lane more than they do provides direct support for the assumption 𝑣𝑣1 < 𝑣𝑣2 , which is necessary for
the discouragement effect to apply, as described in Section 3. Moreover, a substantial number of
people state that they would leave the lane in order to avoid conflict (29% for the first and the
fourth option). At the same time, the fact that more than half of respondents mention helping people
as a reason for moving lanes indicates that social preferences do matter in this setting. It must be
noted, however, that an explanation of our data based on social preferences would require the third
response in question 4 (‘I like to help people’) to be given more frequently in the high valuation
version of the survey. As it turns out, the share of respondents who would leave the lane in order
13

to help the actor is actually much lower in the High Valuation (49%) than in the Low Valuation
(63%) treatment. Hence, while caution requires us to remain open to both mechanisms, we interpret
the survey evidence as showing that the results regarding the actor’s valuation are more likely to
be driven by considerations along the lines of the discouragement effect, and less by pro-social
motives on part of the swimmers.
On a more general note, standing down in a conflict and giving up something out of
altruistic (or, more generally, other-regarding) motivations is often observationally equivalent. Our
view is that the extent to which altruistic or conflict-related motivations are the main driver of
behaviour largely depends on context. For instance, the observation that asking can increase giving
in dictator games (Andreoni and Rao, 2011; Bruttel and Stolley, 2020) could in principle be viewed
through the lens of conflict, where the recipient initiates an argument over a scarce resource
(money); nevertheless, context leads researchers to attribute giving in a dictator game with
communication primarily to altruism. In our experiment, we argue that swimmers largely perceive
the situation as a conflictual one. To begin with, we have staged a scenario in which swimmers
face an unexpected and direct request from a stranger in a face-to-face interaction. Hence, contrary
to lab settings, one is forced to actually interact with a demanding stranger who is challenging one’s
claim to a resource, without any assurance that this claim is artificially made possible within a
controlled interaction protocol (such as an experiment). Second, as already mentioned above, a
considerable number of respondents in question 4 say that they would leave the lane in order to
avoid ‘confrontation’, or wasting time ‘arguing with people’. We believe that verbal confrontation
is unpleasant for most people, and often associated with a substantial amount of effort and costs
for individuals. In addition, some swimmers may believe that the interaction with the actor could
even escalate into physical confrontation. Indeed, responses to question 7 reveal that a considerable
share of respondents (37%) find it ‘possible’ or ‘quite likely’ that the situation described to them
could escalate into physical conflict if they did not agree to move to a different lane. Hence, overall,
we believe that we have been able to create a situation that captures a number of essential aspects
of conflict in this field setting, and is largely perceived as such by individuals.

5. Concluding remarks
We presented new evidence from a natural field experiment on conflict. We studied a situation
where economic agents compete over a scarce resource by expending irreversible effort with no
third party externalities. We analyzed the role of scarcity and valuations in determining the effort
that players choose to invest in conflict. We tested two well-known predictions from the literature
on conflict, the incentive and the discouragement effect, reporting evidence in support of both. In
addition, we presented survey results supporting in different ways our findings, as well as
corroborating that the interaction we staged in our experiment is, indeed, perceived as conflictual
by the population from which our sample is taken.
14

To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first natural field experiment on conflict. The most
likely reason for this lacuna in the literature is that the design of a controlled, natural field
experiment on this topic undoubtedly presents significant challenges. First and foremost, the
selection of a tightly controlled, easily replicable environment, where agents naturally and artlessly
may happen to enter into conflict over a scarce resource; where scarcity, valuations, and effort are
measurable; where third party externalities are absent; and where a conflict can be initiated
inconspicuously, without creating any risk for the participants, and equally unostentatiously
observed for study. An important contribution of our study is that it provides a methodological
advancement that can add to the economist’s toolkit for studying interactions in the field, for which
we possess solely laboratory evidence so far.
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